Abstract : A X.400 Message Handling System (MHS) is usually consists of a number of heterogeneous machines communicating in an OS1 environment which may be subjected to security threat. A model is set up to identify various levels of security in a MHS network. This paper describes a message security mechanism and its implementation on an experiemntal MHS network. The security mesaures are provided at the Network Level, that is, between the originating and the recipient Message Transfer Agents (MTAs). A decentralised public-key based message encryption algorithm is used to eliminate the requirement of a key distribution centre. A set of protocol procedures is defined to enable the change of encryption key at a MTA. A windowing concept is applied to encryption keys to reduce the potential conflict of key changes due to non-uniform message delay through the network.
Introduction
Hong Kong Academic and Research Network (HARNET) is the research and development computer network in Hong Kong. Potential participants of the network are computer users in different institutions, research and development laboratories in Hong Kong. HARNET is a cooperative network. Its administration is distributed, each node on the network shall maintain its own software, communication hardware, and accounting. Gateways to other intemational networks, such as ARPANET and USENET, are maintained by the Department of Computer Science, University of Hong Kong.
One of the major goals of HARNET is to allow information exchange among computer users in Hong Kong. Information exchange includes electronic mail (e-mail) between users and news service among several users of similar interest. With HARNET, resource sharing can be achieved. Also we would like to stimulate computer network applications and research in Hong Kong.
Electronic mailing is one of the major usages of HARNET. In the existing network, different types of machines are connected and different e-mail systems are used, e.g. the Unix mail system is used by all Unix machines and the VAX mail system is used by the Vax machines that run VAXI 43 2
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University of Hong Kong VMS. It is planned to provide a consistent and uniform email system across HARNET. As the CCI'IT X.400 [2] has been widely accepted as a standard for message handling, an experimental X.400 system was developed in the Department of Computer Science, HKU. In order to allow sensitive data to be transmitted on the network, e.g. students' record, a study on incorporating message encryption in the experimental X.400 system was carried out. Our report here will emphasize on providing message encryption capability in the X.400 Message Handling System (MHS).
2.0
Usually, a MHS network consists of an arbitrary number of heterogeneous machines communicating in an OS1 environment which may be subjected to security threat. The issues of providing security on networks can be found in [3] and [4] . This paper describes a message security mechanism and its implementation on an experimental X.400 MHS network.
A model of security at various levels of a MHS network is shown in Fig. 1 .
Model of Data Secu ritv Levels in MHS 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Inter-MTA Link Securitv Level The security measures at this level are provided by each pair of the neighbour Message Transfer Agents (MTAs) along the route of a message.
Network Acess Securitv Level
The security measures at this level are provided by an User Agent (UA) and its associated MTA.
Network Securitv Level The security measures at this level are. provided by the message originating (entry) and recipient (exit) MTAs.
User Agent Securitv Level The security measures at this level are. provided by the originating and recipient User Agents of the message.
Application Securitv Level
The security measures at this level are provided by the user application programs generating the messages.
Not all the security levels identified in the model have to be supported by the MHS. The Network Security Level would be adequate for most applications although the Inter-MTA Link Security Level would provide further security over each link as well. For applications requiring higher security, special measures must be taken at the UA level so that messages are 'protected' before submitting to the MHS network. Of course, extra levels of security can be provided at the application level and/or user application programs level.
In our experimental X.400 MHS network, message encryption capability is conveniently offered as an optional service at the Network Security Level (i.e. by the Originating and Recipient MTAs) to guard message privacy.
Message E ncrvDtioQ
Message EncrvDtion Algorithm
A decentralised public-key based message algorithm is used to eliminate the requirement of a key distribution centre [5] [6]. Each MTA has holds a private key, X, which can be changed following certain protocol procedures described in Section 3.3. This key is only known to the MTA itself. It generates a public key according to the following relationship:
where k is any prime number and p is a large prime number.
This public key will be made known to other MTAs. Therefore, both A and B generate the same key. This key is called the shared key between A and B which can be used as a key for encrypting and decrypting messages sent between A and B. Therefore, no key distribution centre is required for key management.
Alternatively, if one wishes to have messages encrypted by different keys, the shared key is not directly used as the encryption key. Rather, when the MTA A wants to send a message to MTA B, it generates a random number R and computes the session key K by:
, is the DES deciphering transformation with key Km
The message is then encrypted using the session key. The seed number for generating the random number is sent along with the encrypted message. MTA B uses the shared kc-: K,, and random number R to generate the same session key to decrypt the ciphertext.
Consider the pair of inverse functions :
where the base k is a fixed primitive element of Galois Field GF(p).
Within the range 1<= X and Y <= p-1, X and Y are in a one-to-one correspondence since k is primitive.
A cryptographic system is said to be secure if and only if computing logarithms over GF(p) is infeasible [7].
Computation of the public keys Y, and YE and the shared key K, is implemented in GF(P7). It was proved that computing logarithms over GF(2lZ7) is infeasible with current best known algorithm. p is chosen as (P7 -I), a known prime number. k is set to 3 to reduce the overhead in calculating the public key.
The encryption algorithm used is the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) 181 in Cipher Block Chaining mode. The length of key used in the DES algorithm is 64 rather than 128. The extra bits of the session key between two MTAs are EXCLUSIVE ORed with the random number to generate the initialisation vector in the Cipher Block Chaining operation. Since each message is associated with a different random number, its initialization vector is also different. It has been claimed that the key size used in DES algorithm is not secured enough. However, this arrangement should be good enough for most MHS applications. Users demanding higher security are recommended to take special measures at the UA Level or Application Level.
Kev S t o r w
Each MTA stores its own private key, the public keys from other MTAs and the shared keys with other MTAs. All the keys are stored in a local database as shown in Fig. 2 .
The shared key between a pair of MTAs can be changed by exchanging some control messages following the protocol procedure as described in Section 3.3. A copy of the old key must be kept so that any unsuccessful key changing will not hinder future message encryptioddecyption operations. In a MHS network, the delay of a message could be quite long and unpredictable. The routing algorithm used and the traffic conditions of the network may make messages (including messages conveying control information such as key changes) subjected to non-uniform delay and out-of-sequence delivery. This may cause a potential conflict as demonstrated in IFig. 3.
The encryption keys may have been successfully changed before some of the messages encrypted with the old key arrive at the destination MTA. This problem can also be caused by (1) the change of network topology or the underlying subnet; and (2) node or facility failure. In our experimental system, a windowing concept is applied to the encryption keys to lower the probability of conflict. The window size is set to four; that is, up to four versions of keys (previous keys and the new key) are kept in the database. Each encrypted message will include an identifier to indicate which key version is used. The use of four key versions should be sufficient to resolve the potential conflict; unless the encryption keys between a pair of MTAs are changed very frequently. In that case, more versions of key should be maintained or the messages encrypted with keys not within the window cannot be decrypted.
Fev C hanges and Distribution
When a MTA A changes its own private key to XA', it calculates its own new public key, YA'. It makes use of the public keys from the other MTAs to generate a new set of , shared keys. The READY bits of the new shared keys are set to NOT READY. MTA A then sends its new public key to the other MTAs via KEY CHANGE messages. It still uses the old set of keys to perform encryption and decryption.
When a MTA B receives A's public key, it calculates its new shared key with A, KAB. MTA B sets the READY bit of the new shared key to READY. At the same time, it sends a KEY CHANGE CONFIRM message to A together with its own public key, Y,. 00 receiving the confirm message, A checks B's public key in the message against that in the data base. When they match, A sets the READY bit of the new shared key with B; otherwise, A writes the public key to the database and re-calculates the shared key using the public key in the message. It then sends confirm message back to B. MTA B checks A's public key in a similar way. The confm-and-match process will repeat until there is no disagreement between the public keys in A and B.
If the key-change message is lost, A uses the last shared key for encryption if it sends mail to B since the READY flag of the new shared key has not been set. MTA B decrypts the mail using the shared key with the same key version number of the incoming message.
The new shared key in A will be over-written when A changes key next time. The whole process is also carried out between A and the other MTAs.
The lost of the confirm message from B can be recovered by having either one of the MTAs exchanging its public key.
ExDerimental Netwo rk Confieuration
The message encryption experimental network is composed of two HP9000/300 workstations and several 80386- 
Conclusioq
An experimental network has been established with the described message encryption services. The hardware is running reliably and encrypted message are sent between two MTAs. Although the time taken to perform encryption and decryption is at the moment acceptable, the inclusion of more MTAs may push the performance down to an unbearable level. The encryption time will be much reduced by using special encryption hardware. The experimental system demonstrates that the message encryption policy described in this paper can be satisfactorily carried out and would later be extended to include other MTAs.
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